Given recent experiences, the good sides are easily forgotten. But back then, 2014 was a furious, energetic and necessary blast against a Labour Party establishment who had grown accustomed to power. In the words of our late co-author Neil Davidson, Scottish Labour had been reduced to little more than “a cohort of shifty election agents, superannuated full-time trade union officials and clapped-out local councillors”. Something had to change.

The 2014 Yes campaign was a largely working class, left-wing social movement. It campaigned for ­Scottish independence not out of narrow nationalism, but rather as a means to forge an alternative to austerity-ridden, moribund British politics. Both wings of the establishment, in turn, reacted to the movement with derision, condescension and vilification.

Refreshingly, the movement returned the ­compliment, showing none of the usual deference to Westminster elites. This was perhaps best illustrated when 60 Labour MPs arrived at Glasgow ­Central ­Station on the so-called “Love Train” or “Save the ­Union Express”. They were met by Yes ­supporter Matt Lygate, who accompanied them along Buchanan Street on a rickshaw with a sound system playing The Imperial March from Star Wars and ­declaiming through a loudhailer: “Our ­imperial ­masters have ­arrived!” and”People of Glasgow! ­Welcome your ­imperial masters!”.

However, the subsequent eight years have been altogether different. In Scotland After Britain, we trace how, from those disruptive, anti-establishment origins, Scottish independence politics post-2014 was transformed, and not for the better. We also explore what it would take to recapture some of that 2014 spirit in today’s new global crisis.

The SNP: Scotland’s new establishment

THE last eight years, in brutal summary, is the ­story of how the SNP absorbed those 2014 energies to ­become Edinburgh’s natural governing class. In itself, that feat is remarkable: in a time of political turbulence worldwide, they have now governed for 15 years in a row. However, as the new Scottish ­establishment, the party began to replicate many of the governing practices of the establishment they had replaced, Scottish Labour. This may yet prove the party’s undoing.

The SNP have followed their Labour ­predecessors in failing to use the powers at their disposal to ­redistribute wealth and power. A litany of ­problems, drug deaths being only the most dramatic, have ­worsened since the onset of devolution. An ­Edinburgh professional-managerial class of corporate lobbyists, lawyers and NGOs has grown up around this new ­establishment, and the void separating politicians and people – which narrowed in 2014 – has once again become a chasm, evidenced by declining voter turnout.

For an SNP grown accustomed to power, ­independence has come to serve a very different ­purpose to that of 2014. It is now a mechanism for reproducing the status quo at Holyrood. Indeed, the whole business of Edinburgh governance appears quite unimaginable without it. Given the prevailing climate of economic breakdown, there are few other promises that will motivate a loyal cohort to knock doors and donate money. Scotland’s ­run-down Unionist bloc cannot compete with that SNP machine which has been central to their successes.

It also serves a vital role with the wider electorate, as problems can (often ­legitimately) be blamed on the ­Westminster regime, while the party still accrues the benefits of ­being in ­government. The promise of ­independence, always seemingly on the horizon, explains why Sturgeon’s brand of centrist liberal politics, which has ­proven extremely unpopular across ­Europe after the 2008 financial crash, has been so resilient in Scotland.

Every election is thus preceded by fresh commitments for a second independence referendum, and every time those hopes are frustrated. And yes, undoubtedly, much of the blame here lies at the doors of 10 Downing Street, and Westminster more broadly, where both governing ­parties ignore repeated mandates for Scottish self-determination.

However, it is also true that Sturgeon has never sought to mobilise the Scottish people or sympathisers elsewhere to pressure Westminster. The emphasis was always on official channels or electioneering, not the type of popular mobilisation which has energised nationalist breakthroughs in the past.

Tellingly, Sturgeon refused to turn up to the All Under One Banner ­independence demonstrations, some of which were among the largest in Scottish history, ­despite making time to join displaced Blairite elites in the London “People’s Vote” march.

For years, the First Minister has told us that another new mandate would be ­sufficient to break the back of ­Westminster resistance. The ­British state, in her words, “wouldn’t dare” ­ignore the democratic will of the Scottish people. However, the recent shift to the Supreme Court and “plan B” is an illustration of what has been obvious all along: ­ stminster is far less susceptible to democratic pressure than Sturgeon had implied. Crucial years, the peak years of the British crisis, were thus lost to a fantasy, albeit a fantasy that proved effective in re-electing the SNP. More worryingly, little was done in that interregnum to solve inherent conundrums about independence itself, whether over currency or the European single market.

The likely outcome of the current ­strategy is to tighten the finger trap of constitutional politics, rather than to ­resolve anything. Such a deadlock would suit both the Conservatives and the SNP, for different reasons. Equally, a Labour resurgence would solve nothing: in ­itself, a Starmer victory neither opens new space for Scottish self-determination nor kills off the SNP’s constitutional claims. With Westminster regressing to neo-Thatcherite and neo-Blairite blocs, the tragedy is that all the good reasons for independence remain intact. But the worst of all possible worlds is one where Scottish nationalism is permanently ­mobilised without any prospect of a ­conclusive independence.

The independence case

THE clearest sign that the SNP is not ­seriously preparing for a ­second ­independence referendum is the ­messiness of their programme for ­nationhood. The holes are glaring. What currency will an independent Scotland use? Will an independent Scotland be in the EU Single Market or the UK ­internal market? What’s their plan for public ­finances? What’s their plan for North Sea oil?

Sturgeon’s prospectus papers, thus far, have amounted to a litany of complaints about Westminster rule, with no detail on these thorny issues. The last word thus ­remains the Sustainable Growth Commission (SGC), which, for better or worse, remains the only serious basis for assessing what an independent Scotland might look like.

Sadly, the SGC report’s vision for an ­independent Scotland manages to be both high risk and low ambition. A plan for “Sterlingisation” (informally using the UK pound without any monetary ­powers over that currency) combined with strict deficit and debt limits would see an ­independent Scotland exposed to ­systemic vulnerabilities in the global ­financial system. At the same time, it would minimise desperately needed ­investment in improving public services and the zero-carbon transition.

Beyond the economic weaknesses, the SGC vision would be a ­democratic ­travesty. It would restrict Scottish ­popular sovereignty to a narrow set of choices defined by what is acceptable to financial elites and Bank of England ­governors.

The one policy most closely ­associated with Scottish independence, unilateral disarmament of Trident nuclear ­missiles, is likewise being watered down to smooth entry into Nato. The SNP’s defence spokesperson, Stewart McDonald, has said that an independent Scotland could host nuclear submarines at Faslane temporarily due to Nato “rules around the visiting of nuclear facilities”. This is yet another morally crucial concession of Scottish sovereignty. It also contravenes the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which McDonald and all other SNP politicians officially support.

Our book argues that the SNP’s ­independence vision for minimal ­sovereignty is a relic of the pre-2008 ­crisis era. Nothing has been done to absorb the implications of more than a decade of political and economic ruptures. Having failed to fix the roof when the sun was shining, the coming decade could be yet another story of unhappy deadlock. Our task, collectively, is to avoid that fate.

The two souls of independence

THE SNP has neither a compelling ­strategy to achieve independence nor a coherent vision for what an ­independent country would look like, but all is not lost. Many independence supporters, ­inside and outside the SNP, do not share the Scottish Government’s commitment to a model of neoliberal globalisation which is very clearly in decline. ­Neither do they believe that relying on the

­official ­channels of the British state will get us closer to an independence ­referendum.

That’s why, in our book, we speak of “two souls of independence”, one ­represented by “independence-from-above” and the other by “independence-from-below”. Independence-from-below is less clearly defined than its more ­established counterpart, but it implies a constitutional vision based around ­deepening popular sovereignty; prioritising popular mobilisation; and maximising prospects for democratic ­control of the economy.

Independence-from-above is ­clearly the dominant force in Scottish ­politics today, but there are traces of ­independence-from-below wherever the Yes movement gathers. Reinvigorating this spirit is ­essential, not just because the SNP’s vision is backward-looking, but also because a popular alternative to the SNP leadership is a precondition for any type of independence.

There is nothing arbitrary about this conclusion. It reflects generations of knowledge about what makes social movements successful in history. A ­consistent thread is what historian ­Herbert H Haines calls “the radical flank effect”. In his acclaimed history of the ­American civil rights movement, Haines found that the radical flank was pivotal to its ­success: firstly, because it kept the mainstream leaders honest; secondly, ­because it frightened the state into ­negotiations with the mainstream leaders.

The implications should be clear. ­Sturgeon – who is not just the leader of the independence movement but also the head of a devolved part of the UK state – faces intense institutional ­pressures to conform. This is why, by quite ­deliberately absorbing the 2014 ­energy into a ­centralised electioneering machine, she has compromised the SNP’s substantive goal.

While Sturgeon might dismiss a left-wing flank as an unhelpful or ­offputting distraction, history suggests not ­merely that it must exist, but that it must be ­autonomous from – and willing to ­criticise – the established leaders of the independence cause.

Reviving the independence movement means taking coalition-building seriously, within and beyond Scotland’s borders. With heavy cuts coming from Westminster and Holyrood, and an imminent “cost of living” catastrophe, alliances must be more than just street-level cheerleaders for the Edinburgh parliament’s talking points.

The movement needs moral ­independence from the Scottish ­Government.

A powerful movement of this kind would aid the independence cause. But it would also give the forces of ­independence-from-below a genuine stake in the creation of any prospective independent state.

In the harsh business of ­establishing a nation state, with all the circling ­vultures of global capitalism, ­idealism and good faith are not enough to ­ensure even ­moderate social justice. If ­independence-from-below is to become more than a dream, it must out-fight and out-organise the forces of the new ­Scottish ­establishment.