THERESA May’s withdrawal agreement looks dead in the water barely after the ink is dry on its 585 pages.

Those civil servants who have slaved over it for the last weeks and months must be livid, but all parties and even many Tories are against it.

Despite this and multiple resignations from the Cabinet, Theresa May ploughed on – seemingly convinced that she could just limp on regardless. But no amount of awful Maybot dancing will distract attention from the abject failure of the UK Brexit negotiations that we must now conclude is the denouement of this phase of the Brexit process.

There is no deal – at least in practical political terms – and never has so much paper been wasted by so many people in pursuit of so little. The implications of this reality are potentially profound – not least for Northern Ireland.

Doomsday scenarios have been dubbed “project fear” of course by those on the Brexit-or-bust side of the argument and the point has been made on several occasions that we were told the roof would fall in if there was a leave vote, and that hasn’t come to pass.

But we are now at the point where we move from Brexit in theory to Brexit in practice – and if a no-deal scenario is operated in an atmosphere of animosity between UK and former EU partners, then further destabilisation within the UK Government is very likely, up to and including a change of leader and General Election.

A no-deal scenario would mean no transition period for new arrangements to be made and potentially lots of delays at airports and over the import and export of goods and components between the UK and into the EU. It is impossible to predict the dimensions of this, as much will depend on how strictly a no-deal outcome is interpreted.

In the Irish context, Anglo-Irish relations, already under huge strain, are also likely to deteriorate further, especially if a hard border is enacted. In local terms this is all likely to be very bad news for the DUP who have propped up the UK Government that has now delivered arguably the biggest political failure since 1939. Suez does not even come close, as it damaged the UK reputation and external brand but did not stretch its internal political fabric to breaking point or wreck its economy.

The DUP have been the midwife to this political failure and thus are implicated in it. This should throw a potential life line to the UUP – and will be a test for the leadership of that party as to whether they can win back support that has leaked across to the DUP since 1998.

Sinn Fein will be emboldened now in terms of their demands for a border poll and nationalist opinion more broadly will find the idea of Irish reunification more attractive if it brings with it EU membership.

Unionists in the longer term may gradually reinterpret their political positions as the Union was originally based on arguments of economic benefit and fear of theocratic Catholic Irish Free State within a largely agricultural and inwardly Gaelic culture. Ireland arguably presents a much more attractive agenda for Unionists in 2020 than it did in 1920.

And then there is the economy. Again difficult to predict but financial instability in the markets, a run on the pound, hikes in interest rates and a recession that puts 2008 in the shade are highly likely if a no-deal outcome is the only alternative to the withdrawal agreement.

The irony in all of this is that while the DUP supported Brexit and Sinn Fein have strenuously opposed it, it has the capacity to destroy the Union and precipitate Irish unity. None of this of course is going to help Northern Ireland put its political institutions back together again, and when the time comes to do so, the foundation stone of a strong London-Dublin mutual guarantor relationship may not be there to help.

Again, this is worst case scenario thinking – if you are Unionist at least – and it might all work out much less traumatically than this. But Brexit is certainly a gamble on the livelihoods and possibly the political destinies of people in Northern Ireland, Ireland, the UK and the EU too. People of all political persuasions in Northern Ireland should be insisting that they do not become the political sacrifice at the end of the Brexit process – assuming it does end eventually.

The lack of a government at Stormont to represent the interests of people in Northern Ireland is a scandal that will stain the political class long after the RHI scandal is long forgotten. And before any readers engage in exasperated complaints about their politicians, it might be worth remembering that there is little public pressure on either the DUP or Sinn Fein to go back into government over Brexit – indeed they are more likely to be rewarded by voters for not doing so, and punished if they do.

In some ways, therefore, Brexit presents a more existential question. What is the point of Northern Ireland if it cannot mobilise around Brexit in the interests of those who live there?

Feargal Cochrane is professor of International Conflict Analysis at the University of Kent. His current research is examining the impact of Brexit on the peace process in Northern Ireland and its devolved institutions