DISCUSSIONS of nationalism are suddenly everywhere because of the international climate. There are the brave Ukrainians defending their country and democracy, inspired by nationalism – alongside the grotesque example of Putin’s brutal nationalism fuelling his military aggression and lack of humanity.

This has brought forth reflections about the state and character of Scottish nationalism. Last week, in The Times, Kenny Farquharson commented that the Ukrainian crisis had forced him to rethink what he thought about nationalism and then commented on Scotland that “public discourse about nationalism is blunt and unsophisticated”.

These comments provoked Pat Kane, who pointed out that Scotland has had decades debating nationalism, most prominently in the work of Tom Nairn, who was influenced by Ernest Gellner, which in turn inspired a whole generation of thinkers in Scotland, the UK and internationally.

It is not only that. Farquharson’s comments ignored the pioneering work of the likes of Graeme Morton on Unionism at its peak in the 19th century and its expression of “Unionism-nationalism”. Unionism being a form of nationalism which, at its most confidence, had the audacity to cloak itself in the colours of autonomy, distinctiveness and standing against London centralisation.

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Farquharson then took to Twitter with the observation that “ask any indy supporter to spell out the circumstances that would make indy unnecessary and they go a bit quiet”. This resulted in Rob Dunsmore replying: “I’m sure most thoughtful pro-indy supporters could describe a reformed UK they’d be ‘happy’ with, but you never see pro-UKers reciprocate.”

Underlying this is the debate about “existential and utilitarian nationalism’ cited by Nicola Sturgeon a decade ago, which touched on not just the nature of nationalism but the appeal of independence.

Missing from Farquharson’s take is that Scottish nationalism may have been one of the major factors in the rise of independence, but is not the sole factor. A social democratic constituency, anti-Toryism and the democratic argument that Scotland should get the government it votes for have also been influential factors.

This is not an arcane point. Not all independence supporters are Scottish nationalists, just as not everyone who voted No in 2014 or who supports the Union is a Unionist. There are numerous rationales for supporting independence and supporting the Union and, for all the competing claims of the two nationalisms – Scottish and British – they are not the only isms in play.

Farquharson’s point about never meeting an independence supporter who has admitted what it would take to change their minds is a caricature. It misses that independence is an alliance of Scottish nationalists who support the principle of independence unconditionally and a significant coalition of broadly centre-left social democratic opinion.

This latter group is driven by disgust at the direction of the UK over the past few decades and think an independent Scotland could do better. My assessment of the balance between these two groups – with independence on 50% support – is that each of these groups represents approximately half of the independence coalition.

It is true that if a majority Labour government were elected which could tackle inequality and poverty and democratise the British state, a part of the independence constituency would have second thoughts; the answer Farquharson thought didn’t exist. But it would be a big ask for many of us to believe it could deliver and do what no previous Labour government has done in remaking Britain.

It is also true that the slow descent of Britain into one of the most unequal countries in the developed world, with rising relative and absolute poverty, and an increasingly corrupt political system, asks questions of pro-Union supporters. How far can the Union descend before a significant part of such support decides that they could change their minds?

There is a wider set of observations in this. Scottish nationalism is, in the words of Michael Billig, a “banal nationalism”, meaning that it is ubiquitous, mainstream, and in places, not even that political. It is possible that you can be a Scottish nationalist and not support independence, although this would be news to Gordon Brown.

The prevailing expression of Scottish nationalism in recent decades has been centre-left, progressive, European and supportive of liberal, democratic, multi-cultural and multi-national ideas. We all know this story.

Yet it is also true that while Scottish nationalism has been one of the drivers of the Scottish debate, it has less to offer as a moral compass for the future of a self-governing Scotland. There are numerous reasons for this, but one is that under independence, Scottish nationalism will become the “official” ideology of the state and nation, and hence there will be the need for other ideologies which shape the choices we would face. This isn’t unusual but true of everywhere, with independent states seldom likely to reflect on their nationalism; Ireland, US and France being obvious examples.

No-one should fall for the argument that Scotland’s debate should just be about the claim of two competing nationalisms, or as some pro-Union voices do, try to blame all Scotland’s problems on the rise of Scottish nationalism. Doesn’t the Scottish Labour tradition which was dominant for 50 years across the country bare some responsibility for the state of things?

Yet it is also true that the salience of two nationalisms has ended up overshadowing other political traditions such as social democracy and socialism – in part because they were already in decline and lacking in dynamism and energy. David Torrance’s Standing Up for Scotland: Nationalist Unionism and Scottish Party Politics, 1884-2014 – just out in paperback – explores the different variants spinning of “Unionism-nationalism”, even rightly posing Alex Salmond’s 2014 independence as within this tradition with its five unions – only wanting to end the sixth: the political union.

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Torrance is right that “who stands up for Scotland?” has become one of the political clarion calls of Scotland in the Union, beloved by Unionists and nationalists and supporters of all parties. But it does embody an emptiness, for it implies there is one Scotland interest-wise, rather than many different Scotlands and choices within it.

We do have to understand Scottish nationalisms, see it within the sociology of nationalisms to which Nairn and Gellner contributed so much, and resist the monochrome caricatures of Gordon Brown and assertions of Kenny Farquharson which try to pigeonhole independence supporters as unconditional believers.

Scottish nationalism is part of our fabric as a society. There are as many variants of it as is possible to imagine. It should not be simply presented as one-dimensional, nor seen in completely romantic, sentimental colours.

Scotland’s journey to increasing self-government is the product of a myriad of voices, traditions and philosophies. Scottish nationalism’s appeal and rationale has been a defining story of modern Scotland, but understanding its nuances and limits will be pivotal to our future and the future of independence.