I’VE read my fair share of sentencing remarks by judges, but few have been as upsetting as in the following case.  On December 11 at Birmingham Crown Court, John Broadhurst,  a millionaire property tycoon, pleaded guilty to the manslaughter by gross negligence of his partner, Natalie Connolly. He had originally faced trial for murder. He was  jailed for but three years and eight months for a series of actions so cold, callous and detached that  they led to the violent death of a young mother he’d known for just a few months.

The facts in brief: Broadhurst and Connolly had been drinking all day, and continued upon their return home. They’d taken cocaine. They had “rough sex”. By 6am, Natalie was dead. The case was summarised as the unfortunate consequence of rough sex, intoxication and poor judgment. It’s a stark reminder that the shape of justice favours men and fails women. This is a reminder of how sexual choices, seemingly made freely, work against a woman’s interest within the judicial system. The acceptance of rough sex has become mainstream, but this has not translated to a holistic understanding of the particulars  of women’s sexual freedom within the law.

The judge said he could not be sure Connolly was not capable of consenting, although the a toxicology report categorised her blood alcohol level as putting her at risk of “coma or death”. This makes a mockery of consent and exposes the slippery concept of agency.

During the evening of December 18, 2016, Connolly sustained more than 40 injuries. Broadhurst hit her with his hands and beat her on the bottom with his boot, causing severe bruising and haemorrhage into the fatty tissues of her body.

He left her lying at the foot of the stairs, bleeding from her head and from her nose, with a fractured eye socket. She was also bleeding internally after an object was placed inside her.

Broadhurst noticed blood on his hands, and that Connolly’s speech was incoherent. Imagine this is you. Your partner is barely conscious, if at all, bleeding from multiple wounds and incapable of forming a sentence. She’s naked, bruised and you’ve broken a foreign body inside her. What’s your next move?

Broadhurst didn’t make any further attempt to help her. He didn’t call an ambulance. Even a pillow for her head or a blanket were a kindness too far. He didn’t place her in the recovery position or make any attempt to care for her, be it in health or in dignity. He left her where she was, gravely injured, sexually violated, and went to bed. In the morning when he eventually called for help, he described her as “dead as a doughnut”.

She had been drunk, intoxicated, and gravely injured. He was drunk, though considerably less so than Connolly. He was capable of extreme sexual violence towards a woman he supposedly loved, ignoring her need for immediate care. But, because Connolly had enjoyed “rough sex” in the past, Broadhurst was given extraordinary latitude to injure her, despite her diminished capacity to agree or participate. However much she consented to in the beginning, if consent was even possible, she did not agree to die on the floor.

How exactly does a woman who can’t stand up give consent? How does a woman with so much cocaine and alcohol in her system that she was close to comatose convince a much larger man to continue beating her? A level of cocaine and alcohol so extreme, the coroner said he’d never seen such levels together. A level so high the symptoms would include complete or near complete unconsciousness, depressed or abolished reflexes, circulatory and respiratory impairment and a high risk of death?

Yet Connolly’s apparent consent was given more weight than the severity of the injury. The sentencing remarks in this case focus on Broadhurst’s dereliction of duty in seeking medical help for her. He claimed that he had wanted to stop, but that she “made him”. It begs the question: how much violence does there need to be for something like this to be considered more than “rough sex”?

Of course, dead women cannot testify. We have to take the word of their abusers, who will insist on the agency of their partners. We’re not supposed to criticise the concept of agency because to do so would be to paint women as victims and rob them of their right to be agentic actors in their own sexual encounters – even if they lead to their ultimate demise. Clearly, this is wrong. Augmenting women’s sexual freedom on paper to be on par with that of men is to ignore the specifically gendered ways women are victimised by men.

There is a glaring disparity between the types of crimes women suffer and the justice that is available to them. Men are more likely to be violently attacked by a stranger, but for women the most significant threat is likely to come from someone we know. Domestic violence, coercive control and sexual violence shape our victimhood. The abuse we suffer at the hands of men is often sexual and hidden from view.

The law as applied in this case does not reflect the severe harm an able-bodied man can do to us even though we’ve consented. In the law, we do not see our own interests reflected, or our personal experience understood. The imbalance of consequence for a woman’s supposed sexual freedom is rarely considered or applied.

Here, we see the sex-positivity paradox. It is tempting to think that women giving women the freedom to choose the type of sex they have is ultimately liberating. Obviously, there is little liberation in dying as a result of that freedom.  The increased visibility and social acceptance of sexual kink and consensual violence have not gained any new ground for women.  Women might be seen to be “empowered” by the plurality of their sexual choices, but the dimensions of violence against women seem to be ignored in the application of the law. Women  can never be equally sexually empowered in a patriarchal society or adequately safeguarded by the vestiges of a patriarchal legal system that is blind to that imbalance of consequence.

Natalie Connolly’s agency and choice as an individual were mitigating factors against the brutal violence inflicted against her. Agency in this sense offers an idealised view of sexual interaction that misses the social, cultural, patriarchal structures, power dynamics and privileging of male sexual desire that shape the concept.

What has this sex-positivism contributed to women’s justice? In this case, I would argue nothing. Natalie Connolly’s choice to have “rough sex”, or to trust her partner to stop, did not save her from his excesses. The law did not protect her. A change of attitude did not serve her.

This case is a reminder that  sexual agency has limits, and that consent is weaponised against women. It should be the job of the law to apply these limits in the interest of victims who cannot  offer their side. No justice has  been served here.