THEY were never meant to be read by the public, but yesterday memos from Tony Blair to George W Bush revealed the extent of backroom dealing over war in Iraq.

Almost 30 documents have been declassified and published as part of the Chilcot Report. The material was released following protracted negotiations between the inquiry team, headed by Sir John Chilcot, and the government which ended in a 2014 agreement that only “gists or quotes” from 29 memos could be used.

The deal also ensured that Bush’s views would not be included.

The result now reveals for the first time that Blair committed to backing US military action in 2002 – eight months before MPs voted to go to war – telling Bush: “I’ll be with you, whatever.”

The memo said: “Getting rid of Saddam is the right thing to do. He is a potential threat. He could be contained. But containment as we found with al Qaeda is always risky. His departure would free up the region. And his regime is probably, with the possible exception of North Korea, the most brutal and inhumane in the world.

“The first question is: In removing him, do you want/need a coalition? The US could do it alone, with UK support. The danger is, as ever with these things, unintended consequences.

“Suppose it got militarily tricky. Suppose Iraq suffered unexpected civilian casualties. Suppose the Arab street finally erupted. Suppose Saddam felt sufficiently politically strong, if militarily weak in conventional terms, to let off WMD. Suppose that, without any coalition, the Iraqis feel ambivalent about being invaded and real Iraqis, not Saddam’s special guard, decide to offer resistance.

“If we win quickly, everyone will be our friend. If we don’t and they haven’t been bound in beforehand, recriminations will start fast.”

In another message, which was not seen by then-Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon or Foreign Secretary Jack Straw prior to sending, says Germany, France, Italy and Spain were unlikely to back military action without UN agreement.

It adds: “And – and here is my real point – public opinion is public opinion. And opinion in the US is quite simply on a different planet from opinion here, in Europe or in the Arab world.

“In Britain, right now I couldn’t be sure of support from Parliament, Party, public or even some of the Cabinet. And this is Britain. In Europe generally, people just don’t have the same sense of urgency post-9/11 as people in the US ... at the moment oddly, our best ally might be Russia.”

In another missive, Blair says he has been told America thinks the evidence case for war is “unnecessary”, but argues that Saddam Hussein should be linked with the September 11 attacks to win popular support in the UK.

He wrote: “If we recapitulate all the WMD evidence, add his attempts to secure nuclear capability, and as seems possible, add on an al Qaida link, it will be hugely persuasive over here. Plus, of course, the abhorrent nature of the regime.”

Another memo suggests striking in early 2003, adding the “crucial issue is not when, but how”.

Reacting to the release, First Minister Nicola Sturgeon said the report was “damning”, tweeting: “I’ll be with you whatever’ Blair to Bush commitment also suggests pre-determination and lack of proper decision-making. Lack of preparation for aftermath and failure to properly equip/support troops for scale of challenge also appalling.”


Memos show war was seen as step to ‘new world order’

Tony Blair to George Bush. October 11, 2001

“There is a real willingness in the Middle East to get Saddam out, but a total opposition to mixing this up with the current operation [Afghanistan]... If we hit Iraq now, we would lose the Arab world, Russia, probably half the EU and my fear is the impact of all of that on Pakistan. However, I am sure we can devise a strategy for Saddam deliverable at a later date.”

July 28, 2002

“Getting rid of Saddam is the right thing to do. He is a potential threat. He could be contained. But containment, as we found with Al Qaeda, is always risky. His departure would free up the region. And his regime is probably, with the possible exception of North Korea, the most brutal and inhumane in the world.

“The first question is: In removing him, do you want/need a coalition? The US could do it alone, with UK support. The danger is, as ever with these things, unintended consequences.

“Suppose it got militarily tricky. Suppose Iraq suffered unexpected civilian casualties. Suppose the Arab street finally erupted. Suppose Saddam felt sufficiently politically strong, if militarily weak in conventional terms, to let off WMD. Suppose that, without any coalition, the Iraqis feel ambivalent about being invaded and real Iraqis, not Saddam’s special guard, decide to offer resistance.

“If we win quickly, everyone will be our friend. If we don’t... recriminations will start fast.”

January 24, 2003

“What’s the problem? If we delay, we risk Saddam messing us about, sucking us back into a game of hide and seek with the [UN] inspectors where, unless they find ‘the smoking gun’, the thing drags on forever until we give up or get distracted.”

February 19, 2003

On a plan for a second UN resolution: “It allows us to show the world we are going to war, not because we want to, but because we have to.

“Above all, it shows the US reaching out, understanding concerns, but still firmly willing to act... It gives the Europeans something to rally round. When we do act, it will show we went the last mile for peace.”

March 26, 2003, six days after US missiles hit Baghdad

“This is the moment when you can define international politics for the next generation: the true post-cold war world order. 

“Our ambition is big: to construct a global agenda around which we can unite the world; rather than dividing it into rival centres of power.

“So our fundamental goal is to spread our values of freedom, democracy, tolerance and the rule of law, but we need a broad based agenda capable of unifying the world, to get it. That’s why, though Iraq’s WMD is the immediate justification for action, ridding Iraq of Saddam is the real prize.”