MORE than 13 years after Britain went to war in Iraq, the report of the subsequent enquiry will finally be published today. It has taken longer to produce than the British engagement in the main campaign although it is difficult to argue that the conflict that was unleashed in 2003 has ever actually finished or indeed that Britain has ever completely withdrawn. This is particularly resonant given the deaths of more than 160 Iraqis in a bombing in Baghdad over the weekend. The continuing death toll from the activities of Daesh, political conflict between Shia, Sunni and Kurd stands testimony to why Chilcot is so important. However, if the report is essential in understanding how decisions made in Westminster could have such consequences it is also critical as a testimony as to why so many lives were lost in such an apparently ill-thought-through enterprise.
However, we should be prepared for a lack of real surprises.
The raw material of documents and interview transcripts has been available for some time and indeed, the material that has not been made available has been identified, most notably transcripts of phone conversations between Bush and Blair. It is likely to deal primarily with how the processes and people of the Government in Westminster contributed to such ultimately poor decision-making. In this the report will always face the criticism that it has the benefit of hindsight. Perhaps unsurprisingly, a number of the key players including Blair have already outlined their defence that they relied on intelligence that was ultimately inaccurate and that this led to the failure to understand what was at play in the region.
So what should we not expect to see from Chilcot? Firstly, while there may be criticism of Blair he will not be labelled as a war criminal. Chilcot made it clear the enquiry was not a court of law and the crime of aggression which would be the most appropriate charge remains one which is not agreed upon in international law. What perhaps he is most guilty of is the sin of hubris alongside many in the US administration in believing that international intervention alone would lead to a new democratic and peaceful future for Iraq post-Saddam. It was this hubris that led to so many deaths and is a theme that will be returned to. We are unlikely to see anyone in particular blamed for the failings of British military equipment, most notably the “Snatch” Land Rovers.
THE failure to be properly equipped to deal with a developing insurgency was the consequence of a failure to plan for what would happen after the invasion. This in turn reflects the hubris mentioned above and the misplaced faith that invasion would lead to liberation and hence seamlessly to a stable democracy. The evidence for this from previous interventions was mixed.
It might also be argued that a certain arrogance existed in the British military that the retreat from Empire and experience in Northern Ireland had given them an expertise in countering insurgency that was second to none. This contributed to a delay in recognising that there was a need for a different approach and different equipment. Ultimately, the US military proved more adept at learning the lessons quickly as the occupation unravelled.
But if we are not going to see these criticisms what might we see? Firstly, the report must reflect upon the way that the political culture of Whitehall has contributed to the failure. The cherished independence of civil servants and military officers has been consistently undermined.
The fact that the UK’s Permanent Joint Headquarters which ran the British elements of the campaign still describes its role as providing politically-aware military advice speaks volumes. Individuals are aware that to challenge a minister or his special adviser can ultimately be career limiting and this in turns leads to compromises in the advice provided. This culture in turn means that those who do speak out are seen as outliers and those who did advise against the invasion whether government employee or independent academic were ignored.
The report must also highlight the importance of a more considered approach to the use of intelligence. The obsession with secret intelligence from human agents, intercepts and satellite imagery appeared to dominate thinking while the considered views of academics with long-term expertise in the region were largely undervalued. Secret intelligence clearly has a value but by its very nature it is vulnerable to manipulation or accidental misunderstanding. It should always be used in the context of a broader understanding of a problem and its context.
The clear confusion over the existence or otherwise of WMD or a WMD programme in both the US and the UK is evidence of this.
It would also be useful if the report considered the nature of the UK-US relationship both in intelligence and more broadly so that even if the Bush-Blair conversations are missing, we can reach an understanding about how each influenced the other’s perceptions and decision-making.
A lot is expected from the report and it is not going to satisfy all audiences. However, It is vital the important lessons for how the business of conflict is conducted by the UK Government that must be identified, are not lost in the noise of the post-Brexit political tomfoolery currently dominating Westminster. Many died during the period the report covered and continue to do so today in the aftermath of the events it seeks to understand.
That should be reason enough for the current babble in Whitehall to cease even if only briefly and for the thoughts of Chilcot and his team to get the consideration they deserve.
Ewan Lawson is a Senior Research Fellow for Military Influence at the Royal United Services Institute thinktank
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